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FORMALIZING THE PLEA BARGAINING PROCESS AFTER LAFLER AND FRYE
Sabrina Mirza*
INTRODUCTION
Ninety-seven percent of federal criminal prosecutions and ninety-five percent of state
criminal prosecutions do not go to trial; instead, they are resolved by way of guilty pleas. 1 The
centrality of plea bargaining in our contemporary criminal justice system, thus, cannot be
denied.2 In recognition of this reality, the Supreme Court recently decided two cases on the same
day: Lafler v. Cooper3 and Missouri v. Frye.4 By a 5-4 decision in both cases, the Supreme Court
held that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel extends to negotiations
made by defense counsel during the plea bargaining process.5 In so holding, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that plea bargaining is “not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the
criminal justice system.”6
More specifically, the Court held that a criminal defendant who decides to go to trial,
rather than accept a favorable plea offer, is entitled to post-conviction relief if his or her refusal
*J.D. Candidate, 2015, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. in Philosophy and Middle Eastern Studies,
Rutgers University, 2011. Special thanks to Professor Bernard Freamon for his thoughtful comments and
suggestions, and the members of the Seton Hall Legislative Journal for their editorial assistance.
1
Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, tbl.
5.24.2010, http:// www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5242010.pdf; id. tbl. 5.46.2006,
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5462006.pdf.
2
See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 (1970) (insisting that plea bargaining is “inherent in the criminal
law and its administration” and that “[d]isposition of charges after plea discussions is not only an essential part of
the [criminal] process but a highly desirable part for many reasons.”) (quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.
257, 261 (1971)).
3
132 S. Ct. 1376, at 1388 (2012) (commenting on the “the reality that criminal justice today is for the most part a
system of pleas, not a system of trials.”).
4
132 S. Ct. 1399, at 1407 (2012) (“In today’s criminal justice system, therefore, the negotiation of a plea bargain,
rather than the unfolding of a trial, is almost always the critical point for a defendant.”).
5
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”); Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 at 1407; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384
(“Defendants have a Sixth Amendment Right to counsel, a right that extends to the plea-bargaining process.”).
6
Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, at 1407 (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101
YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)) (emphasis in original).
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or failure to accept the plea offer “was the result of ineffective assistance during the plea
negotiation process.”7 Lafler and Frye address two different plea bargaining situations that might
give rise to a post-conviction ineffective assistance of counsel claim: (1) if the defense counsel
provides constitutionally deficient legal advice that leads the defendant to reject a plea offer, or
(2) if the defense counsel neglects to inform the defendant of a plea offer, which then lapses.8
Such claims are now to be evaluated under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington,9
which requires the defendant to show first that their defense counsel made errors falling below
the constitutional standard and second, that those errors prejudiced the defendant’s case so as to
deprive him or her of a fair result.10
Recognition of a right to effective assistance during plea bargaining, in a system that
relies heavily on plea offers, is a victory in its own right, despite its belated timing.11 The reach
of the Court’s recognition of this right, however, is not entirely clear.12 In order to better
understand this lack of clarity, it is helpful to first understand how plea bargaining works. In
general, plea bargaining is a “negotiated agreement” by which a defendant agrees to plead guilty
in exchange for the prosecutor’s offer of a more lenient sentence or dismissal of other charges. 13
It is a process dictated by personal style, rather than any hard-and-fast rules.14 Moreover, it is a
process that takes place largely “off the record.”15 This makes the vast majority of plea offers

7

Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1386.
Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383; Frye, 132 S.Ct. at 1404.
9
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
10
Id. at 687.
11
See Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reforms, 126 HARV. L. REV. 150 at 151
(2012) (“The Court, like Rip Van Winkle, has at last awoken from its long slumber and sees the vast field it has left
all but unregulated.”).
12
See Part II (discussing cases both denying and accepting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel where
defendant did not receive a “formal” plea offer).
13
See infra note 97 (defining “plea bargaining”).
14
Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408 (citing Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, at 741 (2011)).
15
Bibas, supra note 11, at 150.
8
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“informal,” with the exception of plea offers that are required by some states to be in writing,
which make the plea offer “formal” by creating a record of it.16
The reach of the Court’s holding is uncertain because it uses the words “formal offer”
sporadically in Frye, including in the holding, and not at all in Lafler.17 Consequently, it is
unclear, under Lafler and Frye, whether an informal plea offer can form the basis of an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim or whether, in order to assert a claim, the defendant must
have received a written plea offer, one thereby “formally” offered by the prosecution.18 This
confusion presents an important issue because most states do not require a plea offer to be in
writing.19 Where there is no record of ongoing plea discussions, the defendant is faced with the
difficult, if not impossible, task of proving the prejudice prong of Strickland if he or she receives
constitutionally deficient advice – that is, but for his or her defense counsel’s ineffective
assistance of counsel, the defendant would have accepted a guilty plea.20
This Note will argue that it is still difficult for a defendant to succeed on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, following a refusal to accept a plea offer, due to: 1) the lack of
clarity on the reach of the holdings in Lafler and Frye, and 2) the lack of formal requirements
during the plea bargaining process. As discussed, the prejudice prong of Strickland requires the
defendant to show that he or she would not have accepted the plea offer absent defense counsel’s

16

See infra note 128 for a survey of states that require plea offers to be in writing and states that do not.
Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408-10 (using the words “formal offer” six different times); Lafler, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (never
using the words “formal offer”).
18
See infra Part II (discussing cases both denying and accepting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel where
defendant did not receive a “formal” plea offer).
19
See infra note 128..
20
Bibas, supra note 11, at 162 (“Few defendants have documentary or other evidence that their attorneys did not tell
them of a plea offer or gave them incorrect advice. Given the difficulty of proving such claims and satisfying both of
Strickland’s prongs, few Strickland claims of any sort succeed, let alone fabricated ones.”); see also Jenny Roberts,
Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650 at 2671 (2013) (describing how “obstacles have made relief
from ineffective assistance generally inaccessible to individual litigants, and Strickland its progeny are deserving of
the well-developed body of scholarly critique about the hurdles the doctrine has constructed.”)
17
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erroneous legal advice.21 Lower courts disagree about whether the holdings in Lafler and Frye
should be limited to “formal” plea offers or extend to all plea offers.22 This Note argues that it
makes better sense, constitutionally, to extend the Lafler and Frye holdings to all plea offers.23
Such an interpretation recognizes the reality that extensive negotiations often occur between
defense counsel and the prosecution, usually without the defendant present, before any plea offer
is committed to writing.24 Moreover, this approach does not penalize the defendant for relying on
a plea offer that the prosecution and the defense counsel failed to put into writing.
The second requirement under the prejudice prong of Strickland, as applied in Lafler and
Frye, requires the defendant to show that if he or she had accepted the plea offer, there is a
reasonable probability that the prosecution and the court would have accepted the offer to plead
guilty.25 The prosecution and the courts, however, generally have broad unregulated discretion to
reject a plea bargain after the defendant accepts it, and there is no clear standard establishing
what the practice of courts and prosecutors is in such circumstances.26 This means that,
regardless of whether the defendant would have accepted the plea offer, the defendant’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claim could easily be denied on the sometimes baseless ground
that the plea offer would not have been accepted by the lower court or the prosecution.27 In order
to safeguard the right afforded to defendants under Lafler and Frye, the plea bargaining process

21

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
See infra Part II (discussing cases both denying and accepting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel where
defendant did not receive a “formal” plea offer).
23
See Roberts, supra note 20 at 2672 (discussing the Court’s intent in Frye when using “formal” plea offer
language).
24
Id. at 2671 (“A more powerful critique of regulating the plea bargaining process is that because bargaining
happens off the record between prosecution and defense – and normally outside the defendant’s presence – it is
difficult to adequately examine any later claim of ineffectiveness in that process.”).
25
Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1409 (“Defendants must also demonstrate a reasonable probability the plea would have been
entered without the prosecution canceling it or the trial court refusing to accept it, if they had the authority to
exercise that discretion under state law.”).
26
See Bibas, supra note 11, at 162.
27
Id.
22
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should be formalized by requiring written plea offers and standardized procedures that guide
how the prosecution and courts may reject plea offers.
Part I of this Note provides background on the Supreme Court’s development of a
standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims during the plea bargaining process, and how
that standard has changed after the most recent decisions of Lafler and Frye. Part II shows that
there is now confusion in the lower courts as to whether the holdings in Lafler and Frye apply to
all plea offers, or only to those plea offers that are considered “formal.” Part II further analyzes
the plea bargaining process and why informality in the process places defendants at a distinct
disadvantage when bringing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Part III examines the
statutes and court rules of the states, as well as the ABA Criminal Justice Standards, the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, in order to
determine where formal processes may already be in play and where they ought to be. Finally,
Part IV balances the policy implications for the duties of defense counsel and the prosecution
that would be affected by carrying out the recommended formalization of the plea bargaining
process outlined in Part III.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Standard under Hill v. Lockhart and Padilla v. Kentucky
Prior to Lafler and Frye, the Supreme Court addressed the right to effective assistance of
counsel during the plea bargaining process in two decisions: Hill v. Lockhart28 and Padilla v.
Kentucky.29 In Hill, the Court held that the correct standard for courts to apply in assessing
ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the plea bargaining context is the two-prong test set

28
29

474 U.S. 52 (1985).
130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).

5

forth in Strickland.30 Before Hill, the Court focused instead on whether the defense counsel’s
advice caused the defendant to enter a plea involuntarily or unintelligently. 31 Now, under the
Strickland standard, in order to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the
defendant must satisfy two prongs:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose
result is reliable.32
Hill involved a petitioner who pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and theft of
property.33 He later brought a habeas petition based on ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging
that his counsel failed to advise him about his parole eligibility date – specifically that he would
have to serve half of his sentence before he was eligible for parole.34 The Court held that
Petitioner did not satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland because he failed to allege in his
petition that, had his counsel correctly advised him, he would have gone to trial instead of
accepting the guilty plea.”35 The holding in Hill was limited. The Court stated: “[w]e find it
unnecessary to determine whether there may be circumstances under which erroneous advice by
counsel as to parole eligibility may be deemed constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel,
because in the present case we conclude that petitioner's allegations are insufficient to satisfy the
Strickland v. Washington requirement of ‘prejudice.’”36 Thus, Hill left open the question of

30

Hill, 474 U.S. at 58.
See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Brady, 397 U.S. 742.
32
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
33
Hill, 474 U.S. at 53.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 59-60.
36
Id. at 60.
31
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whether the defense counsel is under a constitutional duty to negotiate effectively during the plea
bargaining process.37
In Padilla, the defense counsel had misinformed the defendant about the consequences of
pleading guilty, advising him that it would not result in deportation. This advice was plainly
wrong and defendant faced deportation as a result of his guilty plea.38 While the Court in Hill
was reluctant to determine whether erroneous advice as to parole eligibility could constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel in other cases, the Court in Padilla found that, “advice
regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel.”39 Padilla was concerned with only the first prong of Strickland – whether defense
counsel’s erroneous advice regarding the guilty plea amounted to performance falling below the
reasonableness standard of effective assistance of counsel – and held that the advice did fall
below the reasonableness standard.40 Despite the fact that the Court did not reach the prejudice
issue, the Padilla majority used strong language favoring a broadening of the scope of the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.41 In focusing its discussion on the
consequences of bad advice for defendants, the Court emphasized that, “we have long
recognized that the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of
the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.”42
Although Padilla expanded defense counsel duties after Hill, the standard for ineffective
assistance of counsel still did not require the defense counsel to obtain a favorable deal for the
defendant. Padilla and Hill dealt specifically with the situation in which a defendant accepts a

37

Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The Indirect Potential of Lafler and Frye, 51 DUQ L. REV. 633, at 634 (2013).
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478.
39
Id. at 1476.
40
Id. at 1482.
41
Id. at 1486 (“It is our responsibility under the Constitution to ensure that no criminal defendant—whether a citizen
or not—is left to the ‘mercies of incompetent counsel.’”) (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759).
42
Id. at 1481.
38
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guilty plea and foregoes trial.43 Lafler and Frye differ significantly from the facts of Padilla and
Hill in that they involve defendants who reject plea offers and go to trial, alleging that they
would not have rejected the plea offer if they were correctly informed by their counsel. 44 The
new question facing the Supreme Court in Lafler and Frye was whether a defendant could assert
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim if he received a fair trial. Not only did the Court in
Lafler and Frye hold that a defendant could bring such a claim, but it also required defense
counsel to satisfy the Sixth Amendment by negotiating effectively during the plea bargaining
process.45 Now, errors in the negotiation process may satisfy the prejudice prong under
Strickland and thereby constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.46
B. Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye
i. The Facts
In Lafler, Anthony Cooper pointed a gun at Kali Mundy’s head, fired a shot, and
missed.47 Mundy fled, and Cooper followed, firing additional shots.48 Mundy survived, with
gunshot wounds in her buttocks, hip, and abdomen.49 Cooper was charged with assault with
intent to murder, possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony, misdemeanor possession
of marijuana, and for being a habitual offender.50 The prosecution offered, twice, that in
exchange for a guilty plea, it would dismiss two of the charges and recommend a sentence of 51
to 85 months on the remaining charges.51 Cooper rejected these offers, allegedly because his
defense counsel “convinced him that the prosecution would be unable to establish his intent to
43

Hill, 474 U.S. at 368; Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478.
Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1406 (distinguishing the legal issue in Hill and Padilla from the one presented in Frye).
45
See Oliver supra note 37, at 633 (“The Supreme Court's two previous forays into this area recognized the right to
the effective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining but did not recognize the right to an effective negotiator.”).
46
Id.
47
Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
44
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murder Mundy because she was shot below the waist.”52 Cooper was offered a less favorable
plea at trial, which he rejected, and was subsequently convicted on all counts, receiving a
mandatory minimum jail sentence of 185 to 360 months.53 Cooper appealed, claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel, and the state court of appeals rejected his claim.54 Thereafter, the United
States District Court granted Cooper’s petition for habeas relief, and ordered specific
performance of the original plea offer.55 The Sixth Circuit affirmed, essentially because Cooper
received a higher sentence due to his counsel’s ineffective assistance.56
In Frye, Galin Frye was charged with driving with a revoked driver’s license.57 This was
his fourth offense, after three previous convictions, so it was considered a felony punishable by
up to four years imprisonment.58 Frye’s defense counsel was presented with two offers from the
prosecutor in exchange for the defendant’s guilty plea: the first offer was for the defendant to
agree to a 3-year sentence with a recommendation of ten days in jail, and the second offer was
that the charge be reduced to a misdemeanor, with a recommendation of a ninety-day sentence.59
Both offers expired without the defense counsel ever advising Frye of their existence.60 Frye was
sentenced to three years in jail after pleading guilty on the eve of trial.61 Frye then sought state
post-conviction relief, alleging that his counsel denied him effective assistance of counsel by
failing to inform him of the prosecutor’s plea offer.62 Although the trial court denied his motion,
the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Frye satisfied the requirements for an

52

Id.
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 1384.
56
Id.
57
Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1404.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 1404-05.
62
Id. at 1405.
53
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ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland, and remanded the case to the trial court
to either re-try the case or allow Frye to re-plead to the offer.63
ii. The Majority and Dissenting Opinions
Lafler and Frye were argued and decided together. Ultimately, the Supreme Court in
Frye held that, “[t]he Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel extends to the
consideration of plea offers that lapse or are rejected.”64 Moreover, the majority in Lafler
similarly applied the Sixth Amendment right to the plea bargaining process and held that the
court’s remedy granted to the defendant who successfully makes out a Strickland violation must
“neutralize the taint” of the constitutional violation, as long as it does not amount to a “windfall”
or “needlessly squander” state resources.65 In reaching this conclusion, the majority in Lafler
disagreed with the government’s argument that “[a] fair trial wipes clean any deficient
performance by defense counsel during plea bargaining” because that argument “ignores the
reality that criminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.” 66
It is for this reason that the majorities’ opinions in Lafler and Frye are centered on the notion that
defendants are entitled to correct advice on the impact of proposed plea agreements, even though
there is neither a constitutional right to receive a plea offer nor a right to have a judge accept the
plea offer.67
Justice Scalia, in his dissents in Lafler and Frye, refused to recognize that constitutional
rights should attach to the plea bargaining process. In focusing most of his opinion on how plea
bargaining is an embarrassing part of the criminal justice system, Justice Scalia, in many

63

Id. at 1405.
Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1402.
65
Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1381 (citations omitted).
66
Id. at 1388.
67
Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1410 (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 at 561) (finding no Constitutional right to be
offered a plea); (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 247 at 262) (finding no federal right for a judge to accept a
plea).
64
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respects, does not respond to the arguments made in the majoritys’ opinions.68 His argument
about how the system ought to be ignores the reality that guilty plea dispositions in actuality
command the vast majority of state and federal criminal convictions.69 Justice Scalia’s response
to this reality, much like the argument made by the government, is that no injustice has been
committed against the defendant who received the “exorbitant gold standard of American justice
– a full-dress criminal trial.”70 Where plea bargaining commands the criminal justice system,
however, a “full-dress criminal trial” cannot be relied upon alone to protect the constitutional
rights of defendants.
While Justice Scalia may have missed the mark with his discussion on plea bargaining in
the criminal justice system, in other parts of his opinion, he sheds light on important questions
the majority opinion failed to address.71 In particular, Frye provides that in circumstances where
defense counsel causes a plea offer to lapse or to be rejected, defendants must show, under the
prejudice prong of Strickland, a reasonable probability that: (1) they would have accepted the
plea offer absent ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) the prosecution would not have rejected
the plea offer later if they had discretion to reject it under state law; (3) the trial court would not
have refused to accept the plea offer if it had discretion to reject it under state law. 72 The
majority opinion essentially avoids the issue of how the defendant would be able to satisfy the
second and third requirements under Frye, asserting:
It can be assumed that in most jurisdictions prosecutors and judges
are familiar with the boundaries of acceptable plea bargains and
sentences. So in most instances it should not be difficult to make
Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1397 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today . . . the Supreme Court of the United States elevates
plea bargaining from a necessary evil to a constitutional entitlement. It is no longer a somewhat embarrassing
adjunct to our criminal justice system.”).
69
See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 1.
70
Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1397-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[t]he Court today opens a whole new field of
constitutionalized criminal procedure: plea-bargaining law.”).
71
Id. at 1391.
72
Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1409.
68
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an objective assessment as to whether or not a particular fact or
intervening circumstance would suffice, in the normal course, to
cause prosecutorial withdrawal or judicial nonapproval of a plea
bargain.73
In this attempt to address how the defendant must prove two out of the three requirements under
Frye, the majority simply makes an assumption - “it should not be difficult to make an objective
assessment” regarding the ordinary practices of prosecution and courts when rejecting plea offers
– and it does not explain where that assumption is coming from. Justice Scalia retorts:
“[a]ssuredly it can [be assumed], just as it can be assumed that the sun rises in the west; but I
know of no basis for the assumption.”74 The majority’s statement is less than satisfactory for
Justice Scalia, and more so for defendants, who are likely to encounter difficulties trying to
prove that prosecutors and courts would have accepted the plea offer, in the absence of any
standards articulating their practices.75 Justice Scalia raises questions that demonstrate some of
these difficulties:
Is it constitutional, for example, for the prosecution to withdraw a
plea offer that has already been accepted? Or to withdraw an offer
before the defense has had adequate time to consider and accept it?
Or to make no plea offer at all, even though its case is weakthereby excluding the defendant from ‘the criminal justice
system’?76
These questions indicate the need for procedural guidelines governing how the prosecution and
the court may reject plea offers in order for defendants to be able to prove the second prong of
Strickland.
While codified standards were not specifically referenced as guides for meeting the
second (prejudice) prong of Strickland, under the first prong of Strickland, courts are required to
73

Id. at 1410.
Id. at 1413 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
75
See, e.g., Bibas supra note 11 at 162 (“[d]efendants will find it hard to prove that prosecutors would have left plea
offers on the table and that judges would have accepted proposed bargains, and thus that defendants would
ultimately have benefited from the proposed bargains.”).
76
Id. at 1392.
74
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look to professional norms of attorney conduct to determine whether defense counsel’s
performance was ineffective.77 The majority decision in Frye extends the Strickland idea to
defense counsel’s performance during plea bargain negotiations, stating, “[t]hough the standard
for counsel’s performance is not determined solely by reference to codified standards of
professional practice, these standards can be important guides.”78 Specifically, the majority cited
ABA standards and state bar professional standards, as well as state rules and state and federal
case law to define the duties of defense counsel under the Sixth Amendment.79 Such standards
help defendants prove the first prong of Strickland, and guide judges in their determination of
whether the first prong has been met; similar standards codifying how the prosecution and courts
may reject plea offers would also help defendants prove the second prong of Strickland, as well
as help judges reach a fair result on such claims.80
II. FORMAL VS. INFORMAL PLEA OFFERS
A. Confusion over whether “Formal Offer” is required to Show Prejudice
An important part of the holding in Frye states, “[d]efense counsel has the duty to
communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that
may be favorable to the accused.”81 Justice Kennedy clarified the meaning of “formal offer” as
used in Frye, stating, “the fact of a formal offer means that its terms and its processing can be
documented so that what took place in the negotiation process becomes more clear if some later
inquiry turns on the conduct of earlier pretrial negotiations.”82 As previously noted, the Supreme

77

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408 (emphases added).
79
Id., 1408-09.
80
See Part III (examining codified requirements of plea bargaining).
81
Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408 (emphasis added).
82
Frye 132 S. Ct. at 1409.
78
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Court uses the word “formal” in Frye, but not in Lafler.83 This inconsistent use of the “formal
offer” language between the decisions of Lafler and Frye suggests that the Court did not intend
to limit its holdings to formal offers.84
In recent cases, however, courts have denied claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
for the reason that no “formal offer” was extended to the defendant. One court even cites Lafler
as authority for requiring the defendant to be offered a “formal” plea offer, despite the Lafler
opinion not containing any “formal offer” language.85 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals adds
to the confusion in its opinion, Kingsberry v. United States,86 decided prior to Lafler and Frye,
holding that a formal offer is required to show prejudice for a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. The Kingsberry court stated:
We address the prejudice component, assuming arguendo that the
performance of Kingsberry's trial counsel fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness. We begin by noting that prejudice is
possible, notwithstanding a subsequent fair trial, where counsel
failed to provide accurate advice regarding a plea agreement offer.
Logic dictates therefore, that to establish such prejudice, the
petitioner must begin by proving that a plea agreement was
formally offered by the government. Kingsberry argues that the
contradictory affidavits submitted on this issue create a fact
dispute, mandating an evidentiary hearing. We disagree.
The record before this Court is sufficient to show conclusively that
a formal plea offer never materialized. The two parties necessarily
privy to a plea offer and fundamental to resolution of this issue
both deny the existence of a plea agreement offer . . . . No facts
casting genuine doubt upon the veracity of [trial counsel's]
affidavit were presented.87
Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408-10 (using the words “formal offer” six different times); Lafler, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (never
using the words “formal offer”).
84
See Roberts, supra note 20 at 2662 (“Surely, if the Court meant to limit the right to effective assistance to
informing and counseling defendants about formal plea offers the prosecution has extended, it would not have
repeatedly used the words “plea bargaining,” “plea negotiations,” and “negotiation of a plea bargain.”).
85
See DeFilippo v. United States, 09-CV-4153 NGG, 2013 WL 817196, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2013) (“Thus, the
lack of a formal plea offer strongly weighs against a finding that DeFilippo would have pled guilty. See Lafler 132
S. Ct. at 1385.”) (quoting Judge Garaufis).
86
202 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2000).
87
Id. at 1032-33 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted; citations omitted).
83
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The Northern District of Iowa interpreted Kingsberry, in Johnson v. United States,88 as
“establish[ing] the requirement of a formal plea offer from the prosecution to be a bright line test
of prejudice arising from counsel's deficient performance in plea negotiations.”89 On the basis of
this interpretation, the Johnson court rejected the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel because he was not extended a formal offer.90 The Johnson court cited the Sixth
Amendment as authority for denying the defendant’s claim based on there being no formal offer
presented to the defendant.91
By contrast, in another Northern District of Iowa case, Wanatee v. Ault,92 the court found
that the defendant was offered a formal plea as required under Kingsberry even though the offer
was not in writing.93 The court arrived at this conclusion by distinguishing the facts of Wanatee
from those in Kingsberry. In Kingsberry, the defendant initiated plea negotiations by proffering
information, after which the government did not make a plea offer because it found the proffer to
be inadequate, while in Wanatee, the defendant proffered information only after the prosecution
extended a plea offer.94 This distinction confuses the issue of what constitutes a “formal offer”
because it is not based on whether or not the offer was in writing.

88

860 F. Supp. 2d 663 (N.D. Iowa 2012).
Id. at 789.
90
Id. at 790 (“Where no formal offer of a plea agreement from the prosecution ever materialized, Johnson cannot
make the bright line showing necessary to prove prejudice in plea negotiations.”) (citing Kingsberry, 202 F.3d at
1032).
91
Johnson v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 2d 663 at 788 (N.D. Iowa 2012) (“Trial counsel's deficient performance in
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Some recent cases rely on a combination of Lafler, Frye, and Kingsberry to dismiss
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for lack of prejudice when no formal plea offer was
extended.95 On the other hand, other courts have explicitly found that, “[t]he absence of a formal
plea offer does not necessarily mean there were no plea negotiations.”96 Thus, the need to clarify
the “formal offer” distinction used in Frye is evident.
B. The Plea Bargaining Process
In order to better understand the distinction between formal and informal plea offers, as
well as the rules and statutes governing plea bargaining, a more basic question is worth
exploring: what exactly is the plea bargaining process and how does it work? To begin, Black’s
Law Dictionary defines a “plea bargain” as, “[a] negotiated agreement between a prosecutor and
a criminal defendant whereby the defendant pleads guilty to a lesser offense or to one of multiple
charges in exchange for some concession by the prosecutor, usually a more lenient sentence or a
dismissal of the other charges.”97
This definition, characterizing a plea bargain as a “negotiated agreement,” describes plea
bargaining as a type of negotiation. Courts look to negotiation texts for guidance in evaluating
whether defense counsel is negotiating effectively during the plea bargaining process,

See Williams v. United States, 2:08-CR-00112-GZS-2, 2013 WL 2155390, at *4 (D. Me. May 17, 2013) (“When
there is no formal offer on the table, this particular duty [for defense counsel to communicate formal offers, under
Frye] does not arise.”); Gilchrist v. United States, CIV. DKC 08-1218, 2012 WL 4520469, at *19 (D. Md. Sept. 27,
2012) (“Petitioner clearly cannot establish the deficient performance prong under Strickland without showing that a
formal plea offer was made.”); Ramos v. United States, CR 01-10369-PBS, 2012 WL 1109081, at *5 (D. Mass.
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CIV 12-4092, 2013 WL 1339722, at *8 (D.S.D. Feb. 7, 2013) (citations omitted) (“Ortiz has failed to prove a plea
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counsel have explicitly denied a plea offer was made.”).
96
Atkinson v. Elwood, CIV.A.01-CIV-5462, 2004 WL 2943665, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2004) (citations omitted).
97
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1270 (9th ed. 2009).
95

16

“stress[ing] preparation as a required component of good negotiation.”98 Also in line with the
definition, courts and legal scholars have viewed the plea bargaining process as governed by
contract principles.99 Yet, if contract principles are being applied to plea bargaining, then why
are there no uniform rules as to when offers must be in writing and whether or not the
prosecution has discretion to reject a plea offer once it has been accepted?100
These questions have become important with respect to ineffective assistance of counsel
claims after Lafler and Frye because defendants must demonstrate a reasonable probability that
the defendant would have accepted the plea and that the prosecution and court would not have
rejected it once it was accepted.101 For example, the Seventh Circuit held that the defendant’s
self-serving statement alone was insufficient to establish a reasonable probability that the
defendant would have accepted the plea offer absent the defense counsel’s ineffective assistance;
“objective evidence” was required to corroborate the defendant’s self-serving statement.102 The
Eleventh Circuit similarly required the defendant to produce objective evidence corroborating his
claim that he wanted to accept a plea offer, but was advised by the defense counsel to reject it.103
The problem with requiring the defendant to present “objective evidence” to corroborate an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim is that the plea bargaining system is often so informal that
it does not require defense counsel or prosecuting attorneys to create any evidence whatsoever
that would make it possible for the defendant to bring such a claim.
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The main reason plea bargaining is informal and largely unregulated, as the Court in Frye
recognized, is because plea bargaining is, “by its nature, defined to a substantial degree by
personal style.”104 For this reason, the Court hesitated to impinge upon defense counsels’ broad
leeway to decide how they wish to negotiate offers with the prosecuting attorneys.105 As a result,
the Court provided little guidance on the duties of defense counsel, setting forth only the bare
minimum for defense counsel to communicate “formal offers” to the defendant.106
This is not to say that there is no process at all governing plea bargaining. In fact, much
has been written on effective negotiating strategies.107 Post-Padilla, the American Bar
Association provided guidance to defense counsel and prosecutors on their duties to inform
defendants of immigration and other consequences of accepting or rejecting a guilty plea. 108 Still,
the extent to which the right to effective assistance of counsel regulates plea bargaining is
uncertain.109 Other guidelines include The National Legal Aid and Defender Association’s
Performance Guidelines for Criminal Defense Representation, which requires counsel to be
“completely familiar” with “concessions that the client might offer” and “benefits the client
might obtain.”110 In addition, “[c]ounsel should attempt to become familiar with the practices
and policies of a particular jurisdiction, judge and prosecuting authority which may affect the
104
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(2d ed. 1981) (discussing different plea-bargaining styles).
105
Id. (“This case presents neither the necessity nor the occasion to define the duties of defense counsel in those
respects, however.”).
106
Id.
107
See, e.g., Dann Orr & Chris Guthrie, Anchoring, Information, Expertise, and Negotiation: New Insights from
Meta-Analysis, 21 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RES. 597 (2006); Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as Effective
Negotiatior: A Systemic Approach, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 73 (1995).
108
Mark Walsh, Weighing the Consequences: Task Force Probes Defense Lawyers’ Role After Padilla, A.B.A. J.,
APR. 2011, at 60-61, available at
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/task_force_probes_defense_lawyers_role_after_padilla/.
109
See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Lafler, Frye, and the Subtle Art of Winning by Losing, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 41 (2012) (“It
remains to be seen whether the Court in Lafler similarly has obliged a defense attorney to push (and how hard?) a
defendant to accept a plea bargain (or, for that matter, to push a prosecutor to offer one).”).
110
Guideline 6.2: The Contents of the Negotiations, THE NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION’S
PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, available at
http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender_Standards/Performance_Guidelines#sixone.

18

content and likely results of negotiated plea bargains.”111 The existence of such guides
demonstrates that defining effective plea bargaining “is neither unrealistic nor impossible to
achieve.”112
Strategies used by the prosecution and defense to negotiate plea bargains vary widely.
This again makes regulation of the process more difficult. Several factors are taken into account
to determine whether a plea agreement should be reached, and if so, what the plea agreement
should entail.113 The factors both parties evaluate include determining the strength of each side’s
case, how the jury is likely to lean in a given location, how evidentiary issues in the case are
governed by legal rules, and what the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (“BATNA”) is
available to each side.114 For defense counsel, such evaluation is a matter of becoming familiar
with “the prosecutor’s personality” and how “the judge’s reactions to specific types of crimes”
will affect the outcome of the case at hand.115 For the prosecution, evaluation comes down to
whether the evidence is strong enough against the defendant to render the case worthwhile to
take to trial.116
The literature describing plea bargaining strategies makes clear that plea bargaining is by
and large a process dictated by experience rather than hard-and-fast rules. As Professors Scott
and Stuntz note:
The problem is that one cannot distinguish between good and bad
bargaining by looking at the process by which the lawyers reached
their deal. A two-minute conversation with the prosecutor in the
hallway with only slight advance preparation may represent
evidence of sloppiness and sloth. Or it may be that defense
counsel, who has a great deal of experience in dealing with similar
111
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cases, knows the market price, realizes that investigation is
extremely unlikely to lead anywhere, and understands how to get
to the best offer expeditiously. In a context where bargaining skill
depends more on knowledge of information about other cases than
on case-specific preparation, it is hard to judge a defense attorney's
performance by his behavior in any one case.117
Thus, evaluation of the performance of counsel during plea bargaining is difficult because less
effort expended by counsel might be indicative of more experience, rather than laziness. Lafler
and Frye have the potential to encourage more discussion of plea bargaining strategies where it
was previously considered taboo.118 Mere discussion, however, is unlikely to bring about the
change needed in order for defendants to succeed on ineffective assistance of counsel claims
during the plea bargaining process.
III. SURVEY OF STATE AND FEDERAL RULES AND STATUTES
A. Standards of Professionally Competent Assistance
Supreme Court cases applying the Strickland standard have looked to the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct to determine competency under the first prong.119 While the Rules do not
explicitly address plea bargaining, the Rules apply to lawyers in their capacities as negotiators.120
Formalization of plea offers, discussed in Part B of this section, would facilitate enforcement of
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically Rule 1.6, by ensuring that
defendants are not denied access to evidence of plea negotiations by defense counsel who invoke
the attorney-client privilege and duty of confidentiality.121
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The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice directly address plea bargaining duties of
defense counsel when negotiating with the prosecution.122 Standard 4-4.1(a) provides:
Defense counsel should conduct a prompt investigation of the
circumstances of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts
relevant to the merits of the case and the penalty in the event of
conviction. The investigation should include efforts to secure
information in the possession of the prosecution and law
enforcement authorities. The duty to investigate exists regardless
of the accused's admissions or statements to defense counsel of
facts constituting guilt or the accused's stated desire to plead
guilty.123
The Supreme Court cited to this standard to establish the incompetency of defense counsel in
Rompilla v. Beard.124 The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Pleas of Guilty discusses the
responsibilities of defense counsel in more detail.125 Standard 14-3.2(b) states that “[d]efense
counsel should not recommend to a defendant acceptance of a plea unless appropriate
investigation and study of the case has been completed.” This standard was fashioned
following Hill and it has not been updated to reflect the Court’s holdings in Lafler and
Frye.126
B. Written Requirement for Plea Offers
In Frye, the Court suggested that in order to prevent “late, frivolous, or fabricated claims
after a later, less advantageous plea offer has been accepted or after a trial leading to conviction
with resulting harsh consequences,” states may require that “all offers must be in writing.” 127 The
Court then cited the New Jersey Court Rule requiring that “any plea offer” from the prosecution
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to the defense be in writing.128 Only a small minority of states, however, currently requires plea
agreements to be in writing and signed by both parties.129 Other states have not stated a writing
requirement, but have encouraged such a requirement in their case law.130 In Alabama, for
example, no writing requirement is codified in the state statutes or court rules, but in Ex parte
Cassady, the Supreme Court stated:
The problem involved here could have been easily avoided had the
plea agreement been written and all the terms and conditions made
a part of the writing. If parties would reduce their plea agreements
to writing, and present them to the trial court prior to sentencing,
rather than afterward, as was done here, resolution of cases
questioning the existence or contents of plea agreements would be
greatly facilitated. The record would also show whether or not the
trial court had accepted the plea agreement.131
Thus, the Alabama Supreme Court makes clear that written plea agreements would greatly
facilitate the resolution of cases where “the existence or contents of plea agreements” is at issue.
Formalization in the form of a written requirement would further allow courts to perform
their duty to ensure that plea agreements have a factual basis. For example, Oregon stipulates
that “[t]he court shall determine whether the plea is the result of prior plea discussions and a plea
agreement. If the plea is the result of a plea agreement, the court shall determine the nature of the
agreement.”132 It would be difficult for a court to determine whether a plea is the result of prior
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plea discussions if there is no record of those prior plea discussions.133 Interestingly,
documentation of these plea discussions is required under Florida law when the defendant is pro
se, requiring that the prosecuting attorney “maintain the record of direct discussions with a
defendant who represents himself or herself and make the record available to the trial judge upon
the entry of a plea arising from these discussions,” but not otherwise.134
As attempts by various states to require oral discussions about plea offers between the
defendant and the prosecution to be recorded in writing make clear, such formalization would
help advance the goal of ensuring that plea offers have a factual basis, in addition to ensuring
that defendants are given a fair chance at proving an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. This
is especially necessary given judicial disinclination to overturn a conviction, which is
exacerbated by the fact that most defendants, in hindsight, would naturally claim they would
have accepted the guilty plea.135 In dealing with cases in which an offer lapses or is rejected,
there is often no record kept of the plea offer, thereby precluding the defendant from succeeding
on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland.136
C. Right of Courts to Reject a Plea
The trial court’s authority to reject a plea offer once the defendant has already accepted it
is derived from the persuasive influence of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.137 Although
this rule affords trial courts broad liberty to reject a plea, “some reviewing courts require a trial
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court to articulate on the record a sound reason for rejecting a plea.”138 Still, the standard for
appellate review does not serve as much of a check on trial court discretion, as the appellate
court can only reverse for an abuse of discretion.139 Until the trial court accepts the plea
agreement, it is not binding upon the parties.140
Every state has codified grounds under which the trial judge may reject a plea offer, with
the exception of South Carolina, which relies upon case law to grant courts the authority to
overrule plea agreements.141 These codifications require trial judges to ensure that the defendant
enters a plea agreement voluntarily and knowingly, that there is a factual basis for the plea offer,
and that due consideration is given to public interest and effective administration of justice.142
The court may allow the defendant to withdraw a plea offer in order to correct a “manifest
injustice” that would otherwise occur.143
While these codifications are helpful, more standardization is required. First, clarification
is needed as to whether these are the only grounds under which a trial court may reject a plea
offer for the purposes of determining whether a defendant’s later claim of ineffective assistance
138
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of counsel should be entertained. Second, as noted earlier, requiring the prosecution and defense
counsel to memorialize their negotiations would help the court determine if there was a factual
basis for the plea.
D. Right of Prosecutors to Withdraw a Plea Bargain Offer Prior to Entry of Plea in Court
In Frye, the Supreme Court stated that under the second prong of Strickland, the
defendant must show “that the plea would have been entered without the prosecution’s canceling
it . . . if they had the authority to exercise that discretion under state law.”144 As Justice Scalia
pointed out, no standard is articulated that describes the grounds under which the prosecution
may exercise this discretion.145 In effect, the prosecution has unregulated discretion to reject a
plea offer, even without a sound basis.146 The potential for abuse makes clear the need for
codifying a standard that sets forth the precise grounds giving rise to the prosecutor’s authority to
reject an accepted plea offer.
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice states, “A prosecutor should not fail to comply
with a plea agreement, unless a defendant fails to comply with a plea agreement or other
extenuating circumstances are present.”147 This standard should be expanded to require the
prosecution to explain under what circumstance the prosecution would have rejected the plea
offer in the event that the defendant had accepted it. If there is a committee of prosecuting
attorneys who discuss and render a decision as to whether or not to accept a defendant’s plea
offer, then this discussion should be recorded in writing. The defendant can then ask for the
record of plea discussions in discovery in the event that the prosecution claims it would not have
accepted the plea offer even if the defendant accepted it.
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Not only does the prosecution have wide discretion to reject a plea offer, but as discussed
earlier, plea bargaining is characterized as a matter of “personal style” that allows the
prosecution the liberty to negotiate in whatever manner it likes.148 Standards should therefore
also be put in place to ensure against unfair bargaining, or in other words, to ensure that the
prosecution is being fair and consistent to all defendants when offering pleas.149 At least one
state, Oregon, has essentially codified a fair bargaining requirement: “Similarly situated
defendants should be afforded equal plea agreement opportunities.”150 Here, as elsewhere, the
movement by some states to codify requirements for the prosecution and the court in connection
with plea bargaining indicates the need for such formalization, and provides an example for other
states to follow.
IV. CONCLUSION
Without formalization of the plea bargaining process from its initial stages of
negotiations, Lafler and Frye will have provided a superficial right to defendants, without a
corresponding ability to carry out this right. More formalization of the process may be an
effective compromise between the extremes of a “laissez-faire bargaining system” on one end
and overregulation of plea bargaining by courts on the other. 151 If the plea bargaining process “is
the criminal justice system,” as the Supreme Court recognizes, and such reality justifies the right
of defendants to challenge a conviction on the basis of receiving ineffective assistance of counsel
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during plea negotiations, then there should be requirements for the process to be recorded and for
standards to ensure that the process is fair.152
The requirements under Strickland articulate what defendants must prove to succeed with
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea bargaining process.153 Under the first
prong, the defendant must show defense counsel’s performance fell below the constitutional
minimum for competency.154 To show incompetency, the defendant must be able to present
evidence from the record; however, in the majority of states neither prosecuting attorneys nor
defense counsel are obligated to create any record.155 Under the second prong of Strickland, the
defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that the defendant would have accepted the
plea absent defense counsel’s ineffective assistance, that the prosecution would not have rejected
the plea, and that the trial court would not have rejected the plea.156 This is where the need for
formalization becomes most evident, as courts have stated that the defendant cannot rely on his
or her self-serving testimony, but must demonstrate “objective evidence” to show that he or she
would have accepted the plea absent defense counsel’s error.157 Even if the defendant can prove
this, the defendant must still demonstrate that the prosecution and the court would not have
rejected the plea offer.158 Both the prosecution and the court, however, are granted broad
discretion; there is no defined standard that states the grounds under which they can reject a plea
offer.159
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The specific recommendations for formalization in the plea bargaining system, as
outlined above, are summarized as follows: first, plea negotiations should be required to be in
writing; second, a standard must be codified, whereby prosecuting attorneys have a duty to
engage in equal and fair bargaining; third, grounds under which prosecuting attorneys may reject
a plea offer should be codified; fourth, oral discussions among prosecuting committees in
deciding whether or not to accept a plea must be reduced to writing; fifth, clarification needs to
be made as to whether the grounds under which a trial court may reject a plea offer, as codified
in state statutes and rules, are the same grounds to be considered for the purposes of determining
whether a defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should be dismissed.
The first recommendation – to put plea negotiations in writing – is the most important in
light of the confusion that has emerged among lower courts over whether or not a defendant must
be presented with a “formal offer” in order to bring a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
during plea bargaining.160 Courts have come to different conclusions on this issue after Lafler
and Frye, with some defining a plea as “formal” even though it was not in writing.161 For the
defendant who must rely on objective evidence independent of self-serving testimony, a writing
requirement is a necessity. Furthermore, such a requirement would improve other areas of plea
bargaining, such as helping the court determine whether there is a factual basis for a plea.162
Much of the discussion on the effect of Lafler and Frye naturally focuses more on
defense counsel, and the more stringent constitutional duty created by these cases.163 Such
discussion centers on ensuring that defense counsel effectively represent their clients because of
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the fact that so much of plea bargaining occurs off the record. 164 Less has been said, however,
about how prosecuting attorneys are affected by the extension of the Sixth Amendment right to
ineffective assistance of counsel to the plea bargaining process.165 Including prosecutors in the
process is in many ways crucial to creating a just plea bargaining system.166 Without doing the
work now to document plea negotiations, the burden on the prosecution at discovery to go
through all of the records to see if there is anything on plea negotiations is potentially very
burdensome. In the long run, more formalization of plea negotiations would ease the burden on
the prosecution and defense counsel when litigation involving an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim is brought.167 Above all, in our criminal justice system, where a majority of cases
are decided by plea bargains, the heaviest burden should not be on the defendant to ensure that
the system is fair.
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